保存脑部符合道德规范吗？对 Sue Blackmore 的文章“离保存大脑更近了一步，但那怎么可能是'你'？”的回应

Authors: Michael Cerullo and Keith Wiley

One of the goals of the Brain Preservation Foundation is to spark debate on all aspects of the idea of preserving brains for future revival by uploading.  The recent announcement of the winning of the Large Mammal Prize [link here] has brought many of these issues to light. Here we want to focus on an article written by BPF advisor Dr. Blackmore in response to the winning of the Large Mammal Prize (Dr. Blackmore prefers to describe herself as a “skeptical advisor”). The article is Brain preservation is a step closer, but how could it ever be ‘you’? [link]  We think this article could serve as a useful starting point to getting at some of the deeper ethical issues involved in brain preservation. This blog post will not focus on issues of personal identity as Dr. Blackmore appears generally sympathetic to those who feel uploading would persevere their identity (see [link] for a discussion of personal identity in uploading).  Rather Dr. Blackmore focuses on concerns about the fairness of any commercial brain preservation as well as existential issues that would face any person who is successfully uploaded.

Let’s first focus on the issue of justice. Any new technology raises concerns that it creates further injustice in the world and favors only a select minority (e.g. the rich). In discussing her concerns about brain preservation, Dr. Blackmore writes:

“They partly concern overpopulation and unfairness – what a horrible world it would be in which rich old people could have their minds  uploaded, taking resources from younger people on an already overcrowded planet. What hubris for anyone to think their brain is worth  preserving when everyone else’s is not.”

Everyone at the Brain Preservation Foundation shares the concern that it would indeed be a horrible world “be in which rich old people could have their minds uploaded.” Unfortunately, Dr. Blackmore does not offer any further discussion on this issue. Many others at the BPF have also thought about such issues. In fact, one of the goals (and a requirement of the prize) is that any brain preservation be made to be affordable. The BPF Bill of Preservation Rights [link] goes on to state:

“If the brain preservation procedure can be made sufficiently inexpensive and reliable, no person should be barred from obtaining a quality brain preservation surgical procedure and quality long-term storage due to lack of funds.”

So we are in complete agreement with Dr. Blackmore here and are working to avoid a scenario in which brain preservation is made available only to the rich. In short, it has never been the BPF’s position that any one person is more deserving of preservation than any other. The winning of the Large Mammal Prize makes a significant step in this direction as the winning procedure used, ASC, can be done relatively inexpensively now and the costs will only go down with the economy of scale if brain preservation becomes widely adopted.

It is also worth noting that brain preservation has never been exclusively developed for the old. Any person facing terminal illness could benefit.  As one of use wrote in an article on the ethics of brain preservation:

“… it should be noted that brain preservation could also be used on the young who would otherwise have died early. In this case, it is hard to see why the genetic lottery is a better way to decide who lives 20 years and who lives 90 years.” (Cerullo 2016 [link])

Dr. Blackmore also raises another concern about justices, that is “taking resources from younger people on an already overcrowded planet.” In our opinion this is the most serious ethical concern brain preservation advocates face.  Again, it should be noted that advocates of brain preservation are aware of this concern and are working toward developing brain preservation procedures that do not rob the young of their resources. As mentioned previously, the goal is to make the preservation procedure inexpensive. Yet this does not address the larger concern about the costs of a world populated by large numbers of uploads. Advocates of brain preservation have also thought about these issues and they are far from clear cut:

“To a large extent [issues of resource depletion by uploads] are open empirical questions. The world population is slowing, and the industrialized nations (including China, Europe, and Japan) are facing severe population decline (Wilson 2004; Morgan and Taylor 2006; Zhavoronkov 2013). In fact, there may be a major economic crisis looming due to the rapid decrease in population of these nations, and this will likely be true of the rest of the world as it increases in development (Rae et al. 2010; Zhavoronkov 2013). Rapid advances in life-extension technology may, indeed, be needed to help the aging population continue to be productive (Rae et al. 2010; Zhavoronkov 2013).

Thus brain preservation and WBE, rather than being a drain on society, may be part of keeping future economies viable. Even if population trends change, society can always choose to delay the revival of preserved brains until such time as economic conditions allow. If these conditions never arrive, the outcome for the individual is no worse than not choosing brain preservation in the first place and anyone pursuing brain preservation should understand these risks. It is also worth mentioning that those revived with WBE need not take up any significant resources or space: if necessary, WBEs could be run in underground computing facilities in a location that allows cheap solar power (e.g. unwanted space in a desert).

A related worry is the lack of distribution of wealth created by inheritance. This concern is more political than ethical and can, in principle, be addressed through legislation (e.g. taxing a certain percentage of a person’s wealth when they are preserved). Currently, cryogenically frozen human beings are treated as anatomical donations and have no rights. Clearly this will become increasingly unacceptable as the evidence for brain preservation grows and the feasibility for WBE increases. This does not mean we must treat those in suspension as if nothing has changed legally. For example, it has been proposed that we could legislate just how much wealth those in a preserved state could choose to have in a trust fund for when they are revived, while the rest of their money could be treated as inheritance (Sandberg 2014). Thus these issues do not seem insurmountable.” (Cerullo 2016 [link])

These short quotes are not meant to be an exhaustive reply to concerns about the just use of resources but instead to illustrate the complexity of these questions and that their dependence on open empirical questions that have yet to be answered.

The next series of arguments in Dr. Blackmore’s article raise extensional issues that face any potential uploader. Dr. Blackmore worries that:

“My guess is that “I” would wake up in my new, perfect artificial body and think, “Wow, here I am again”, only to realise that I was a completely inadequate “person” in this new world. Everyone else’s minds would be so far expanded beyond their original brains into other devices, implanted and external, that they would see me as a profoundly backward human or some kind of throwback from a primitive world they could hardly imagine. My friends, family and old connections would be gone. No one would understand me and I would not understand them.”

Any one who is considering brain preservation needs to seriously think about these issues. Brain preservation and uploading does not promise utopia. Instead it offers a chance to continue in the future, and no one should have the illusion that this will be a simple task.

Dr. Blackmore then states, “This is one more reason why I shall not be signing up for my own brain preservation any time soon.”  This illustrates another fundamental point about brain preservation. It is ultimately an existential choice whether to choose brain preservation or not. The Bill of Preservation Rights states “It is our individual unalienable right to choose death, or to choose the possibility of further life for our memories or identity, as desired.” We respect Dr. Blackmore’s decision not to undergo brain preservation, but this has no force in preventing others from freely choosing brain preservation. A major principle in medical ethics is that people should have the autonomy to choose or refuse a medical procedure (assuming the procedure does no harm to others, i.e. that issues of justice are not violated).

Dr. Blackmore has a few more existential concerns:

“What is a mind anyway? We are far more than just brains and stored memories. We are whole embodied humans, deeply embedded in social worlds. Who am I? I am partly a product of my communications with everyone else. If my brain were preserved today and used in a brilliantly natural-seeming artificial body in a year’s time, then I might indeed wake up and go, “Wow, here I am again”, and take up my old friendships, family connections, email habits, website and Facebook page and still feel that I was the same person – just with a bit of a gap in time like being ill or going travelling for a year. But what if this were done a century hence – when the technology matures?”

No one at the BPF would argue against the importance of those we love. Yet once again it is a choice that needs to be made by each individual contemplating brain preservation as to whether they want to live in a world without those they currently love. Some people may rely more heavily on their their social worlds when determining their personal sense of self and sense of value than others. The latter group’s preferences on such matters should not be dismissed; they are simply a different way of structuring one’s life. Ultimately of course there is nothing preventing friends and family from reuniting in the far future if they all choose brain preservation.

It is also currently an open topic of inquiry as to the importance of embodiment in the nature of human consciousness and identity. We know neither the extent to which embodiment is crucial in the first place, nor the extent to which our sense of self can accommodate alterations of that embodiment. However, amputees, organ transplant recipients, and prosthetics subjects offer great insight into such matters. Initial observations and experiences seem to indicate that our minds, our selves, and our identities can incorporate these experiences, traumas, losses, and medical and technological interventions into ourselves with impressive flexibility.

We would conclude this discussion of existential issues by arguing that no one should take the decision to undergo brain preservation without serious contemplation. We would also remind Dr. Blackmore about a point we are sure she would agree with–one’s discomfort with someone else’s choice is not a valid ethical argument to limit the freedom of others with a different viewpoint.

References:

Cerullo M. The Ethics of Exponential Life Extension. Journal of Evolution and Technology – Vol. 26 Issue 1 – March 2016 – pgs 94-105.